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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellants petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for an Interlocutory Appeal.
The Petition was granted on January 26, 1995 by the Supreme Court and poured into
this Court. Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(k).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this Interlocutory Appeal:
1.

Did the trial court error when it ordered a new trial?

After judgment was entered on the special verdict, the Court ordered a new
trial on the stated basis that one of the questions in the special verdict was contrary
to the law of the case. (R.1392).
The question was:
"Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred
at his residence on October 3, 1990?" (R.1122).
The trial court's ruling was necessarily based upon its conclusion that the question
set forth an incorrect burden of proof.

1

The first issue on appeal, an issue of first impression in Utah, is what was the
proper burden of proof for Farm Bureau to prove its affirmative defense that Greg
Horrell set fire to his own home.
Standard of Review:

Because the trial court's ruling

ordering a new trial was based on its belief that it had
given the jury an incorrect instruction on the burden of
proof, the trial court's order granting a new trial should be
reviewed for correctness. Olympus Hills Shopping v.
Smith's Food & Drug. 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994);
Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984): State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
Issue Preserved in Trial court: These issues were raised
in pretrial and post-trial proceedings. (R.1065, 1284,
1342 A).
2.

Even if the burden of proof instruction to the jury was incorrect,

this Court can determine that it was harmless error.
Standard of Review:

Even if the trial court gave an

incorrect instruction on the burden of proof, the same jury
2

found by "a preponderance of the evidence" that the
Horrells' claim did not rise to the level of being "fairly
debatable." The jury also found that Farm Bureau did not
conduct a diligent investigation. An appellate court will
not reverse a judgment for mere error, unless the error
involved is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v. Rogers.
542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). An error is harmful only if
the likelihood of a different outcome is high enough to
undermine confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Issue Preserved in Trial court: This issue was raised in
the trial court at R.1342T.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
The appellant is not aware of any statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that
are determinative of any issue in this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. The Horrells commenced this action to recover

the benefits of their insurance policy with Utah Farm Bureau and sought damages for
Farm Bureau's "bad faith" conduct in mishandling and denying the claim.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.

After a three week trial in June, 1994, a jury awarded the Horrells the benefits of
their policy and damages for Farm Bureau's conduct. The jury also determined that
the Horrells' claim was not "fairly debatable", and the trial court awarded the
Horrells attorney's fees and costs, making a total judgment of $289,310.37. The
defendants filed post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
motion for a new trial. The trial court ordered that a new trial be had because, the
trial court stated, it had mis-instructed the jury on the burden of proof for Farm
Bureau to prove its affirmative defense that Gregory Horrell intentionally burned his
residence. The Horrells filed a Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal, which Petition
was granted and the matter poured into this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.
C.

Statement of Facts - Relevant to Issues Presented for Review.

4

1.

On October 3, 1990, the residence of Gregory and Barbara

Horrell caught fire. The Horrells' home was destroyed by the fire and the rekindling
of the fire which occurred during that night. (R.2, 16, 1123).
2.

At the time the fire began, the Horrell's residence was insured by

Utah Farm Bureau. (R.2, 16).
3.

Horrells began gathering information shortly after the fire, and

by the end of January, 1991, believed they had given Farm Bureau the information
it needed to process their claim. Between early February, 1991 and late September,
1991, there was no communication between Utah Farm Bureau and the Horrells.
The claims manager for Utah Farm Bureau who was responsible for handling the
claim testified that he kept the Horrells' claim in a file cabinet and hoped that the
Horrells would "go away" during this period of time. It was only after Horrells,
through legal counsel, contacted Farm Bureau in late September, 1991, that Farm
Bureau resumed its investigation. (Tr. 2323, 2024).
4.

In March, 1992, some 18 months after the fire, Utah Farm

Bureau denied the Horrells' claim for insurance benefits under the policy. (Tr.
Exhibit 46).

5

5.

In June, 1992, the Horrells commenced this action against Farm

Bureau seeking benefits under their homeowners' policy with Farm Bureau and
among other things, seeking damages for Utah Farm Bureau's conduct in
mishandling the claim. (R.2).
6.

The precise cause of the fire was never determined. At trial,

plaintiff presented expert testimony that the fire could have been started by accidental
causes and that the precise cause of the fire could not be determined, in part because
of the incomplete investigation done immediately after the fire. (Tr. 2551). Farm
Bureau presented experts who testified that the fire was caused by arson and opined
that Greg Horrell intentionally set the fire. (Tr. 3151, 3192).
7.

At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony on Utah Farm

Bureau's conduct in mishandling the claim. Plaintiffs' expert testified, without
equivocation, that the Horrells' claim was not fairly debatable and that based upon
his experience the claim should have been paid because there was insufficient
information to raise it to the level of debatability. (Tr. 2570, 2622). Farm Bureau
presented testimony that the claim was fairly debatable and that Farm Bureau was
justified in denying the claim. (Tr. 3026).

6

8.

The case was presented to a jury over a three week period

commencing June 7, 1994. On June 24, 1994, the jury returned a special verdict
(R. 1122), a copy of which is included in the Addendum to this brief. In the special
verdict, the jury found as follows:
1)

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which
occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990?

Answer:

No.

2)

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that
either Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally
misrepresented to Farm Bureau material facts
concerning their claim as defined in the jury
instructions?

Answer:

No.

3)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the second fire was rekindling of the first fire?

Answer:

Yes.

4)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts
surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether
the claim was valid?

Answer:

Yes.

7

5)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Farm Bureau breached any of its other contractual
duties of good faith and fair dealing to Horrells,
including the duties to: fairly evaluate the claims;
act fairly and reasonably in either rejecting or
settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as layman
and not as experts in the subtleties of law and
insurance; refrain from injuring the Horrells' ability
to obtain the benefits of the insurance policy?

Answer:

Yes.

6)

Do you find bv a preponderance of the evidence that
the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that
term has been defined in the instructions?

Answer:

No.

(Emphasis added).
9.

The jury awarded Horrells $150,000.00 in damages. (R. 1124).

10.

A judgment based upon the special verdict was entered on August

8, 1994. The judgment was for $289,310.37 and included reasonable attorneys fees,
costs and interest awarded by the trial court as part of the judgment. (R. 1245). A
copy of this judgment is included in the Addendum.
11.

On August 18, 1994, Utah Farm Bureau filed a Motion for a

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion for a New Trial. (R.1284,
1258).
8

12.

On November 4, 1994, at the conclusion of oral argument on

Farm Bureau's motions, the district court ordered that (R.1441):
Defendant's motion for a new trial be and the
same is hereby granted based on the Court's
requiring Defendants at trial to prove their
affirmative defenses of intentional burning
and misrepresentation by clear and
convincing evidence. The Court had, in its
April 19, 1994 Order denying the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment,
ordered that Defendants would be required to
prove their affirmative defenses by a
preponderance of the evidence and the law of
the case that was established by that Order
should have been followed at trial. The grant
of a new trial under the foregoing basis
makes the other grounds set forth in
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict moot.
The August 8, 1994 judgment was vacated and a new trial ordered. (R.1441).
13.

Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. The petition

was granted by the Supreme Court on January 26, 1995. (R.1449). The issues in
this Brief were limited by a prior order of this Court.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The jury was properly instructed on Farm Bureau's burden

of proving intentional burning. The jury was instructed that Farm Bureau had to
prove its defense of intentional burning by clear and convincing evidence. The jury
concluded that this burden of proof had not been met. The jury also determined, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the
facts surrounding Horrell's claim and that Horrell's claim was "fairly debatable."
The burden of proof to be applied to an insurer where arson is alleged as an
affirmative defense is an issue of first impression in Utah. In essence, the defense
is one based upon fraudulent conduct by the insured. The general rule in Utah has
been that proof of fraud must be by clear and convincing evidence. Arson carries
with it even stronger stigmas than allegations of fraud. For the same reasons that
public policy requires that fraud be proven by clear and convincing evidence, proof
of arson should be made by the same standard. Public policy supports the higher
standard of proof.
The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions support the clear and
convincing standard in arson cases. A significant number of other jurisdictions have

10

addressed the burden of proof to be applied in civil arson cases. Many of the cases
supporting the lower burden of proof, i.e., preponderance of the evidence, provide
little or no analysis with respect to the burden of proof. Those cases that have
weighed factors to be considered in establishing a burden of proof have determined
that clear and convincing evidence is the better measure.
If Farm Bureau's defense of arson is considered in light of contract law
principles, the higher burden of proof would also be applicable. The Utah courts
have long recognized that a party seeking to avoid contractual obligations must do
so by clear and convincing evidence. Other Utah decisions have accepted the clear
and convincing evidence standard in civil litigation wherein allegations of quasi
criminal fraudulent conduct are alleged. These cases also support the application of
a clear and convincing standard to the circumstances in this case.
2.

Even if the jury was improperly instructed, under the

circumstances, it was harmless error. This Court may disregard any error or
defect which occurred in instructing the jury which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. The jury in this case answered a number of questions, using
different burdens of proof. In addition to the special interrogatory which required
Farm Bureau to prove their allegations of arson by clear and convincing evidence,
11

the jury was asked to respond to a number of questions using the preponderance of
the evidence standard. For example, the jury determined, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the Horrells' claim did not rise to the level of being "fairly debatable."
The trial court instructed the jury on what fairly debatable meant in the context of
this litigation. In light of all of the special interrogatories which were answered by
the jury, it is clear that they would have reached the same result even if the trial
court had instructed them to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether
the Horrells intentionally set the fire.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE BURDEN
OF PROOF ON FARM BUREAU'S DEFENSE OF INTENTIONAL BURNING.
After judgment was entered in plaintiffs favor (R.1245), Farm Bureau filed
a motion for a new trial and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(R.1258, 1284).
The general rule governing the granting of a new trial is that the trial court
must find at least one of the seven grounds listed in Rule 59 to have been met.
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). While the trial
12

court did not specifically identify any of these seven grounds, Judge Rigtrup stated
in his oral ruling that he was granting a new trial because the Court had not followed
"the law of the case" regarding the burden of proof to be applied to Farm Bureau's
affirmative defenses.

(R.1392).1 There is no controlling Utah case which has

determined what burden of proof should have been applied to Farm Bureau's
affirmative defense. In effect, the new trial was ordered based upon the trial court's
belief that an error of law might have occurred on an issue where the law is unsettled
in Utah.
In its Answer (R.15), Utah Farm Bureau asserted as an affirmative defense
that the Horrells
"Intentionally made misrepresentations of material fact
relating to [their] loss, in violation of the following general
condition in the policy:
Concealment of Fraud. The entire policy will be void if,
whether before or after a loss, an insured has:

1

"Law of the case" does not preclude a trial judge from changing an earlier ruling up to
the time a final decision is formally rendered. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306
at 1311 (Utah App. 1994). Law of the case did not preclude the trial judge from giving the jury
instruction at issue.

13

a.

Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance;

b.

Engaged in any fraudulent conduct; or

c.

Made false
Defense).

statements."

(Ninth

On the last full day of evidence, the trial court permitted the defendants to
amend their Answer to add as an affirmative defense that the Horrells had
intentionally burned their residence. (Tr. 3256, 3269, 3271).
At the conclusion of the three week jury trial, the jury was asked to consider
and return a special verdict. (R. 1122). The questions on the special verdict included
the following:
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which
occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990?
Answer:

4.

Yes

No x

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts
surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether
the claim was valid?
Answer:

Yes

x

No

14

6.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that
term has been defined in the instructions?
Answer:

Yes

No

x

(R.1122). (Emphasis added)

In their motion for a new trial, Farm Bureau argued that the special verdict
should have requested the jury to determine the first question by a "preponderance
of the evidence." The trial court, having determined during the course of preparing
jury instructions with counsel to instruct the jury to make the determination by "clear
and convincing evidence," apparently changed its mind and ordered a new trial.
This appeal followed.
On review, orders granting or denying motions for a new trial will not
ordinarily be reversed by the Appellate Court unless there has been an abuse of
discretion. Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
While it is questionable, at the trial level at least, how an error of law could have
occurred when there is no controlling authority on the issue, that circumstance is
now problematic. The parties are before this Court seeking a determination of the
appropriate burden of proof.
Which burden of proof should be applied to Farm Bureau's defense that it was
excused from performance because of intentional burning in this case is an issue of
15

law and one of first impression in Utah. The standard of review for issues of law
is for correctness. Olympus Hills Shopping v. Smiths Food & Drug. 889 P.2d 445
(Utah 1994).
A.

Public policy supports a "clear and convincing" standard.

The

Horrells agree that public policy should not protect those who would commit arson.
It does not follow, however, that an insurer should be permitted to assert and prove
a defense based on arson by a mere "preponderance" of the evidence.
Public policy does not encourage fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation. And
yet, persons who claim to be the victims of fraud in Utah have always been required
to prove the fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." Pace v. Parish. 247 P.2d
273 (Utah 1952). The burden of proof for fraud has not been reduced simply
because fraud should be discouraged.
One reason that fraud must be proven by a higher standard is because of the
stigma that follows it. A claim of arson carries with it an even stronger stigma.
A claim or defense based on arson is, at a minimum, the legal equivalent of
a claim based on fraud. In this case, Farm Bureau's defense is, in simple common
terms, that Greg Horrell attempted to defraud it by secretly setting his home on fire
and asking to recover on his policy. To be accused of arson carries with it all the
16

stigmas that attach to fraud. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Bloomfield. 637
P.2d 176 at 180 fn. 4, (Ore. 1981).

It is these stigmas that give rise to the

requirement for a higher burden of proof in fraud cases. Jackson v. Rutledge. 231
So.2d 803 (Miss. 1970).
An allegation of civil arson, the burning of one's own home involves a
devastating accusation of moral turpitude. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire
Insur.. 161 Md. 249, 156 A. 847 (Md. 1931). The consequences of the allegations
are immediate and enormous.

Public policy should require that allegations of

criminal/fraudulent conduct be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the same
burden of proof used in fraud cases.
A second public policy reason exists for the application of a higher burden of
proof in arson cases. The policy in this case was an "all-risk" policy whereby Farm
Bureau agreed to insure against damages caused by any fire, regardless of the cause
of the fire (except in the case of fires intentionally started by the insured). (Policy,
R.1201, para. l.h.). Milton Beck testimony, Tr. 2530. Even though the cause of
the fire at the Horrell residence was never established (except by conjecture and
opinion), Farm Bureau seeks through the application of a mere preponderance of the
evidence standard — essentially a 50/50 evidentiary standard - to put the Horrells
17

in a position of having to prove they did not cause the fire. If this lower burden of
proof is adopted for "all risk" fire insurance policies, especially where the cause of
the fire is unknown, insureds would unwittingly be shouldered with the burden to
prove they did not start the fire.

Such a standard would require insureds to

undertake enormous expenditures of time and money immediately after a fire at a
time when they usually have neither. (Tr. 2558). To protect their rights, insureds
would have to employ their own investigators and experts at enormous costs. These
expenditures are the very things insureds seek to avoid when they purchase "all risk"
insurance. (Tr. 2530).
Insurance companies have comparatively great resources to investigate and
determine the cause and origin of a fire. On the other hand, a fire of the type that
occurred here normally devastates the financial resources of the insured. As a result,
the insured has little, if any resources to investigate the cause and origin of the fire.
More importantly, the insured has no reason to undertake an investigation of the
cause and origin of the fire.

The purpose of insurance contracts is to provide

insureds with peace of mind and protection. Insurance companies, because of their
resources, are in a unique position to be able to establish arson by clear and
convincing evidence, the same burden of proof applied in other civil cases where
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moral turpitude is at issue. There is no reason why insurance companies should
obtain special consideration through a lower burden of proof. " [Fjraud is fraud and
where it's raised as a defense in a fire insurance case should not lower the standard
of proof." Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America. 780 P.2d 116 at 134 (Idaho
1989) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
B.

The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions support the clear

and convincing standard in arson cases.

A significant number of other

jurisdictions have addressed the burden of proof to be applied in civil arson cases.
A majority of those cases have applied the lower "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. If Utah were to determine its law simply by counting the number of cases
on each side of the issue from other jurisdictions, there would be little reason for
Utah to have appellate courts.

There are good reasons for Utah to reject the

majority view.
Not all of the cases on either side of the issue can be distinguished. Many of
the cases which have adopted the lower burden of proof are cataloged in a decision,
Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Co.. 540 A.2d 693 (Conn. 1988). Many of the
cases purporting to support the lower burden of proof are either poorly reasoned or
not reasoned at all. In many of the cases the burden of proof was not genuinely in
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dispute. For example, in some of the cases the insurer had lost at trial on the lower
preponderance standard, and neither party was contending on appeal that any higher
burden of proof should have been required. See Texas General Indemnity Co. v.
Speakman. 736 S.W.2d 874 (Texas Civil App. 1987); Zajac v. Great American
Insurance Companies. 410 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1987); Trempe v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.. 480 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 1985). In other cases, the burden of proof did
not appear to have been at issue and there was no discussion within the case of the
factors considered in applying the burden of proof. Precision Printers. Inc. v.
Central Mutual Insurance Co.. 334 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 1985); Caserta v. Allstate
Insurance Co.. 470 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio App. 1983); Seals. Inc. v. Tioga County
Grange Mutual Insurance. 519 A.2d 951 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1986).
Almost none of the cases cited in Verrastro. supra, contain any discussion of
the public policy or the rationale for applying the burden of proof. Some of the
cases cited in Verrastro in support of the preponderance rule actually stand for the
application of a higher level of proof. For example, in Hayseeds. Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty. 352 S.E.2d 73 (W.Va. App. 1986) the court approved a jury
instruction that stated in part as follows:
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Such proof need only be by a preponderance of the
evidence.
However, such proof of voluntary and
intentional burning should be clear and satisfactory, taking
into consideration the presumption of innocence in such
cases, which the evidence must be sufficient to overcome,
and must do more than establish a basis for mere
suspicion, speculation or conjecture. Where circumstantial
evidence is relied on by State Farm, such evidence must
be such as does more than throw a mere suspicion of guilt
on the plaintiff, on the plaintiff, and the inference or
presumption to which the facts give rise must be strong
and almost inevitable. (Emphasis added).
In Clifton v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.. 510 So.2d 759
(La. App. 1987), another case listed in Verrastro as supporting the preponderance
standard, the Louisiana Court of Appeals observed that the burden of proof could be
established by a preponderance of the evidence "where the evidence is of such impact
that it will sustain no other reasonable hypothesis but that the claimant is responsible
for the fire." at 760. It is clear from this language, that the West Virginia and the
Louisiana courts were requiring more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.
Some of the cases which recognize a preponderance of the evidence standard
result from the fact that the state does not recognize a higher burden of proof, i.e.,
clear and convincing, for civil fraud. Dairy Queen of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Travelers
Indemnity Co. of America. 748 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1988).
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The Horrells submit that the better reasoned cases support the higher burden
of proof, clear and convincing evidence.
In Hutt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company. 466 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30
(1983), the court noted that "[t]he more contemporary measure of persuasion is that
of clear and convincing evidence." In Hutt. the trial court required the insurer to
prove its defense of arson only by a preponderance of the evidence, and the appeals
court reversed and ordered a new trial. Hutt states that:
To fasten upon a man the act of wilfully and maliciously
setting fire to his own building should certainly require
more evidence than to establish the fact of payment of a
note, or the truth of an account in set off; because the
improbability or presumption to be overcome in the one
case is much stronger than it is in the other. Hence, it can
never be improper to call the attention of the jury to the
character of the issue, and to remind them that more
evidence should be required to establish grave charges than
to establish trifling or indifferent ones, (quoting 2 Jones,
Commentaries on Evidence [2d ed.], § 563, p. 1036).
Id,
The Hutt court found the "clear and convincing standard . . . more in accord
with New York law which has long imposed a 'far more demanding' burden when
a serious accusation involving moral turpitude, such as fraud, is leveled." IcL at 30,
fn. 2. As discussed subsequently (p. 29, 31), Utah cases have imposed a higher
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burden of proof when accusations of moral turpitude are leveled in civil cases. The
Hutt case is consistent with other Utah decisions in that it observes that fraud in civil
cases must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In Carpenter v. Union Insurance Society of Canton. Ltd.. 284 F.2d 155 (4th
Cir. 1960), (a case arising in South Carolina) in ruling that the "clear and
convincing" standard was the correct burden of proof, the court observed:
"Now if this was an incendiary fire for the purpose of
collecting insurance it was a fraudulent fire. Fraud is
never presumed and must be proven by evidence clear and
convincing." [Citations omitted.] This is fully in accord
with the general principal that the burden of proof of an
act of a criminal nature asserted as a defense in a civil
action is somewhere in between the standard requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case and
the preponderance of evidence requirement in the ordinary
civil case. The proper test is that such defense be
established by clear and convincing proof; that it be shown
by "clear and satisfactory evidence to a reasonable
certainty." Ziegler v. Hustisford Farmers Mut. Ins. Co..
1941, 238 Wis. 298 N.W. 610; 7 Wigmore, Evidence
§2498(3) (3d.ed. 1940).
Id, at 162.
In McGorv v. Allstate Insurance Co.. 527 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1988), the Court
reasoned as follows:

23

To begin with, the burden rests upon an insurer claiming
civil arson to prove it, and this is so whether it be asserted
defensively in an action by the insured on a policy or, as
here, in an action by the insurer for declaratory judgment.
But what of the quantum of proof an insurer must offer to
establish the policy avoidance defense of civil arson?
Many cases and other jurisdictions have held that the
insurers' burden is the conventional "by a preponderance
of the evidence" burden, (citations omitted).
Civil arson seems very much like fraud. And as all know,
Mississippi law requires that a party charging fraud prove
his charge by clear and convincing evidence, (citations
omitted).
. . . civil arson against an insurer, like embezzlement, is
an act of fraud.
The nature of the charge Allstate is leveling against the
McGorys is that they have engaged in an attempt to
defraud Allstate. Though this is not precisely the type of
fraud contemplated by Johnson v. Brewer and the other
cases cited above, we know of no principled basis upon
which it might be distinguished. Quantum of proof
standards reflect the degree of confidence we demand for
particular findings. They measure our willingness to risk
error, (citations omitted). The nature and consequences
of the charge of fraud are such that we demand proof by
clear and convincing evidence, and for good and apparent
reason. No reason has been suggested why fraud by arson
might be established by a lesser quantum of evidence, and
no reason appears.
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More precisely, assuming that our law for good reason
requires that fraud generally be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, no reason has been suggested why
fraud by arson might be proved by a lesser quantum of
evidence, certainly no reason appears to us upon
reflection. When we add Stewart's holding that the charge
of fraud by embezzlement must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the point is made. Accepting the
lesser preponderance standard would only import an
arbitrary distinction into our law, one devoid of principled
justification.
We hold that when an insurer seeks to avoid coverage
under a fire insurance policy charging that the insured has
been guilty of civil arson, the insurer must prove each
element of its claim by clear and convincing evidence.
In Mize v. Hartford Insurance Co.. 567 Fed.Supp. 550, 552 (W.D. Va.
1982), a case applying Virginia law, the Federal District Court looked to an earlier
Virginia decision, Virginia Fire Marine Insurance v. Hogue, 54 S.E. 8 (1906) as
setting forth the burden of proof in civil arson cases in Virginia. Virginia Fire stated
that the defense if civil arson had to be proven by "clear and convincing" proof.
The insurer in Mize attempted to distinguish Virginia Fire on the basis that burden
of proof should apply only to fraudulent misstatements and not to the arson defense.
The Court stated in response:
In my opinion, the rationale of Virginia Fire does not
admit of such a distinction. The whole thrust of the
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Virginia Fire rationale is that where the defense is one of
a criminal act by the insured, the presumption that most
people are law-abiding citizens requires that such assertion
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Arson is one
of the defenses which would come within that
classification, (at 552).
See also Ziegler v. Hustisford Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.. 298 N.W. 610
(Wise. 1941) (rule is well established that in civil actions where crime, fraud,
criminal conduct or conspiracy is alleged, proof must be by "clear and satisfactory
evidence," adopting rationale from Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Ed));
Jonas v. Northeastern Mutual Fire Insurance Co.. 171 N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1969)
(evidence necessary in civil case to prove act that constitutes a crime is "middle
standard of proof - clear, satisfactory and convincing").
At least one court has addressed the philosophical dilemma that would result
if a higher burden of proof is applied to fraud than to arson. In Transamerica
Insurance Co. v. Bloomfield. 637 P.2d 176 at 180 (Ore. App. 1981), the Court
stated in a footnote that:
Although not an issue in this appeal, it is philosophically
perplexing, in light of the "stigma" rationale for the higher
standard [for fraud], that plaintiffs might have proved by
a mere preponderance of the evidence that the defendants
committed arson, but were required to adduce clear and
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convincing evidence to establish their allegations that the
defendants were not being candid in denying that they
admitted arson.
In a scathing dissent to an Idaho opinion adopting the preponderance of the
evidence standard, Justice Bistline in Pacheco v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America,
780 P.2d 116, 123 (Idaho 1989) sets forth a carefully reasoned explanation as to why
the "clear and convincing" standard is more appropriate in civil arson cases. Justice
Bistline observes that a clear and convincing standard often relates to the quality
rather than to the quantum of proof, and that courts have long imposed a far more
demanding burden when serious accusations involving moral turpitude are involved.
(780 P.2d at 130). Justice Bistline points out errors in reasoning in some of the
cases supporting the preponderance of the evidence standard. (780 P.2d 130, 131).
Bistline attacks and debunks the notion that there can be a legitimate distinction
drawn between allegations of fraud and allegations of arson.

Bistline states in

conclusion:
This Court may make use of the record and do so in
connection with resolving the issue as to whether arson is
a species of fraud. Of course it is, and it is fraudulent
conduct, as the New York court noted in Hutt, to buy
insurance coverage and light a fire to the buildings insured
with collection of the policy proceeds in mind. By way of
distinction, to set fire to an enemy's house as a means of
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revenge is not fraudulent, although it is criminal, and also
could result in a damage action sounding in tort.
There is no distinction, however, in alleging arson for
profit or alleging fraudulent conduct, as Safeco initially
did. We can best gauge what Safeco had in mind by its
first pleading where it alleged both. There isn't a hair's
breadth difference between the two. 780 P.2d at 130,
131.
Clear and convincing evidence is essential when a claim of criminal or
fraudulent wrongdoing is made in order to prevent the erroneous tarnishing of the
reputation of the other party. For that and other reasons, courts have required clear
and convincing proof of the defenses of intentional burning (or arson) and material
misrepresentation.

The reason is clear. There is no real distinction between a

defense of arson and a defense of fraud.
C.

Farm Bureau's contentions are ones of contract avoidance, to which

a higher standard of proof should also be applied. Farm Bureau will argue that
their defense of arson is a simple contract defense, subject only to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. As discussed previously, this policy was an "all
risk" policy. Farm Bureau will contend that their contractual obligation to pay for
"all" fires was avoided by Greg Horrell's conduct. This argument, however, ignores
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Utah decisions that have long recognized that claims of contract avoidance are
subject to a higher burden of proof.
For example, efforts to avoid contractual obligations based upon mistake of
fact must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay Peterson. 682
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); Thompson v. Smith. 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980); Neelev v.
Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); Kirchgestner & Denver Rio Grande W. R. R.
Co.. 233 P.2d 699 (Utah 1950).
Claims by a party to a contract that he was induced to enter it by
misrepresentation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Jensen v.
Eddy. 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973). Clear and convincing evidence is required to
show that a writing is not the agreement of the parties. Tippets v. Oppenshaw. 425
P.2d 160 (Utah 1967); Rigglev. DainesMfg.. 463 P.2d 1 (Utah 1969); Otteson v.
Malone. 584 P.2d 878 (Utah 1978).
Facts supporting a right to reformation of a contract must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. Peterson v. Eldridge. 246 P.2d 886 (Utah 1952); Ingram
v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977).
The claims made by Farm Bureau in this case go far beyond a simple breach
of contract. The claim is not that Greg Horrell failed to deliver products purchased
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by Farm Bureau or that he failed to make payments on a note. Farm Bureau's claim
is that it can avoid its contractual obligation to pay the Horrells their covered losses
because Greg Horrell attempted to defraud them by burning his own home.
To fasten upon a man the act of willfully and maliciously
setting fire to his own building should certainly require
more evidence than to establish the fact of payment of a
note, or the truth of an account in set off; because the
improbability or presumption to be overcome in the one
case is much stronger than it is in the other. Hence, it can
never be improper to call the attention of the jury to the
character of the issue, and to remind them that more
evidence should be required to establish grave changes
than to establish trifling or indifferent ones. 2 Jones
Commentaries on Evid. (2d. ed.), §563, p. 1036.
D.

Other Utah cases support a "clear and convincing" burden of proof.

There are other Utah decisions which have recognized the rule that a civil litigant
alleging that the other party has engaged in quasi-criminal fraudulent conduct must
prove that conduct by clear and convincing evidence.
In Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App.
1989), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in a constructively
fraudulent conveyance. This Court observed that the plaintiff had the burden to
prove each element of the claim by clear and convincing evidence (at 458). See also
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Jensen v. Eames. 519 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1974) ("the burden is upon the one
alleging the fraudulent conveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the transfer was in fact fraudulent").
The Utah Supreme Court also has required a higher standard of proof in other
civil cases where one party accused the other with immoral, criminal or fraudulent
conduct.

In Matter of Adoption of Hallo way, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), the

adopting couple was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
child's mother intended to abandon her child. And, clear and convincing evidence
was required in In re McCullough. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939), before an
attorney could be stripped of his livelihood through disbarment.
In a Colorado case, Boulder Valley School District v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085
(Colo. 1991), a teacher brought a federal civil rights claim against the school district.
The Colorado Supreme Court discussed in terms applicable to this case why a higher
standard of proof was appropriate in that civil rights case, stating
A standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the
evidence is justified in civil cases involving allegations of
fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the
defendant. "The interests at stake in those cases are
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money
and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by
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increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof."
omitted.]

[Citation

Id, at 1090.
In this case, where the insurance company defends on the basis that the
insured acted intentionally, fraudulently, committing a criminal act, the higher
burden of proof should be applied. Utah courts have long applied a higher burden
of proof in nearly all types of cases, including contract cases, where contract
avoidance or fraudulent and quasi criminal conduct is alleged. This case should be
no exception.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED, UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs this Court to disregard any
error or defect which occurred during the trial of this case "which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this Rule
to justify reversal, or in this case a new trial, only if Farm Bureau can show error
that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense there is at least a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of the error the result would have been different."
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Ortega v. Thomas. 383 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1963); See also Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) ("an error is harmful only if
the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our
confidence in the verdict."). Horrells argued in the trial court that any potential
error was harmless because of the jury's response to other questions in the Special
Verdict. (F.1342T). The trial court ruled that this argument was moot. (R.1392).
Because Farm Bureau cannot show that the Court's application of the clear and
convincing standard of proof was 1) wrong or 2) prejudicial, the trial court should
not have granted Farm Bureau a new trial.
Courts have frequently looked to juries' special verdicts to determine whether
or not a particular error warrants reversal. See e.g. Howell v. Parker (In re
Richard's Estate). 297 P.2d 542 (Utah 1956) cert. den. 352 U.S. 943; U.S.
Industries. Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co.. 854 F.2d 1223, 1253 (10th Cir. 1988);
Spellacy v. Southern Pacific Co.. 428 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970). In the instant
case, the jury's special verdict eliminates any possibility that the trial court's
application of the clear and convincing standard of proof to Farm Bureau's
affirmative defense was prejudicial.
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Paragraph 6 of the special verdict reads:
6.
Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as
that term has been defined in the instructions? (emphasis
added)
To this question, the jury answered "no." (R.1123). This answer clearly indicates
that the jury would have found that Plaintiff did not intentionally burn his home even
under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
The trial court instructed the jury that:
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the
claim, its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute
a breach of its duty.
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim
if the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and
would lead a reasonable insurance company in similar
circumstances to deny the claim.
"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which
support the insurer's position create a reasonable
likelihood that the denial of the claim would be upheld in
court. In determining whether or not the insurer's position
was fairly debatable and reasonably justified, you should
consider all laws or facts upon which a reasonable
insurance company would rely in deciding whether to pay
a claim.
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Jury Instruction No. 25. (R.1097). The jury was instructed in the Special Verdict
that it was to decide the "fairly debatable" question by a lower "preponderance"
standard.
In this Special Verdict interrogatory, the jury was asked to consider whether
Farm Bureau had "reasonable justification" to deny the claim and whether there was
a "reasonable likelihood" to deny the claim and whether there was a "reasonable
likelihood" that Farm Bureau would prevail in Court. The jury's response was that
there was no reasonable justification for Farm Bureau to deny the claim.
If the jury had determined that Plaintiff intentionally burned his home,
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in paragraph 6 of the
special verdict, this finding would have rendered Plaintiffs claim "fairly debatable."
In other words, if the jury was convinced, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Plaintiff intentionally burned his home, the jury would necessarily have answered
"yes" to Question 6 in the Special Verdict. Its negative answer to that Question 6
clearly shows that the jury was not convinced, even by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Plaintiff intentionally burned his home. Because the jury reached the
same conclusion, based on the lower burden of proof, the error that Farm Bureau
complained of was harmless because there was no likelihood that a different outcome
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would have occurred. Crookston. supra. Therefore, the trial court's application of
the clear and convincing standard to that issue did not prejudice Farm Bureau.
On the issue of harmless error, the case of Walker v. Eason. 643 S.W.2d 390
(Tex. 1982) is comparable to this case. At issue in Walker was whether by placing
the burden of proving mental incapacity upon the wrong party the trial court
committed reversible error. In answering this question, the Court looked to the
jury's response to a special interrogatory to which the jury did not merely answer
"yes" or "no" but rather, affirmatively found that "she did not have sufficient mental
capacity." Id. at 391. The Court held that the trial court's error in establishing the
burden of proof was harmless error because "the jury made a definitive finding that
Pearl Eason 'did not have sufficient mental capacity.'"

LcL Thus, the Court

concluded, the outcome of the trial would have been the same regardless of who had
the burden of proof.
Similarly, the jury in this case has clearly shown in its Special Verdict that the
outcome of this trial would have been the same regardless of the standard of proof
imposed. The trial court's application of the clear and convincing standard of proof
did not prejudice Farm Bureau and the trial court should have denied Farm Bureau's
Motion for New Trial on this issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order granting a new trial should be set aside,
the judgment entered by the District Court on August 8, 1994 based upon the special
verdict should be affirmed, and the matter should be remanded to the District Court
solely for the purpose of determining and awarding additional attorney's fees and
costs.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The plaintiff requests the opportunity to present oral argument on these issues.
DATED this

(7

day of July, 1995.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Appellants

37

ADDENDUM A
(Special Verdict)
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Third-indicia'District
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By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

GREGORY S. HORRELL and
BARBARA HORRELL,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 920903327

vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE CO,,
Defendants.

After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the
jurors are requested to answer the following questions.

Six or

more of you must agree on the answer to each question.
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory

Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence
on October 3, 1990?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No /C

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either

Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm
Bureau material facts concerning their claim as defined in the jury
instructions?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

-2-

If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," then you
should sign and return this Special Verdict,
3.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

second fire was a rekindling of the first fire?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm

Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts surrounding
Horrells' claim to determine whether the claim was valid?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes >C

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm

Bureau breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith
and fair dealing owed to Horrells, including the duties to: fairly
evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably in either rejecting
or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from
injuring the Horrells' ability to obtain the benefits of the
insurance policy?
ANSWER:
6.

Yes X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been
defined in the instructions?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

\

-3-

7.

If your response to Question 3 is "no,11 you may award

only damages resulting from the first fire.

If your response to

question 3 is "yes," then you may award the Horrells damages
suffered as a result of both fires.

Based upon this possible

limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages
suffered by the Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a
result of Farm Bureau's conduct for:
Damage to the Horrells7 residence
(not to exceed $46,500.00)

n/ ~- An
$ ibfj(J(J'UU

Damage to the Horrells7 personal property
(not to exceed $77,000.00)

,~
$ bfjj 000, 00

Damage for Horrells7 loss of use of the

^ ~

property (not to exceed $5,950.00)

$b,/Dp.OP

Demolition

$Affl) -CO

Other general and consequential damages,
as described in the jury instructions,

-

but not including attorney7s fees

TOTAL
Dated this

^1

$ji:b00f

j

n

V0

*)50MO'OD

day of June, l*P*r

A

t\

A

A
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ADDENDUM B
(Judgment)

T

h.rd Judicial District

m 0 8 1934
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREGORY S. HORRELL and BARBARA
HORRELL,

%\^H03°\
^-u-qs-^i^a^.
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
CO.,

Civil No. 920903327CV
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third
District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah for a jury trial beginning on June 7, 1994. The matter was
tried on June 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 and 24, 1994. On June 24, 1994, the jury
returned a special verdict as follows:
After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the jurors are requested to
answer the following questions. Six or more of you must agree on the answer to each
question.

1.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory Horrell
intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

2.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either Gregory or
Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm Bureau material facts concerning
their claim as defined in the jury instructions:
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," the you should sign and return this
Special Verdict.
3.
Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that the second fire was
a rekindling of the first fire?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

4.
Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm Bureau failed
to diligently investigate the facts surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether the
claim was valid?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

5.
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm Bureau
breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to
Horrells, including the duties to: fairly evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably
in either rejecting or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from injuring the Horrells' ability
to obtain the benefits of the insurance policy?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

6.
Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that the Horrells' claim
was "fairly debatable" as that term has been defined in the instructions?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

7.
If you response to Question 3 is "no," you may award only damages
resulting from the first fire. If your response to question 3 is "yes," then you may award
Judgment

Page 2

the Horrells damages suffered as a result of both fires. Based upon this possible
limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages suffered by the
Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a result of Farm Bureau's conduct for:
Damage to the Horrells' residence
(not to exceed $46,500.00)

$ 46,500.00

Damage to the Horrells' personal property
(not to exceed $77,000.00)

$ 60,000.00

Damage for Horrells' loss of use of the
property (not to exceed $5,950.00)

$ 5,950.00

Demolition

$ 2,950.00

Other general and consequential damages,
as described in the jury instructions,
but not including attorney's fees

$ 34,600.00

TOTAL

$150,000.00

Dated this 24 day of June, 1994.
Signed
FOREPERSON
Based upon the special verdict, the pleadings on file herein, the stipulations of the
parties, and all of the proceedings before the court, it is hereby:
ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of the plaintiffs
Gregory S. Horrell and Barbara Horrell and against Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company and
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, jointly and severally, as follows:
$150,000.00, as set forth in the special verdict;
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$ 43,329.37, as prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum calculated as follows:
at 10% per annum from October 4, 1990 until August 4, 1994 on the Horrells'
property damage ($106,500 x 1399 days x 10% per year = $40,820.13); plus
10% per annum on Horrells' additional living expenses as incurred (calculated at
10% from the date of each payment reflected in the receipts in Trial Exhibit 121)
($1,841.66); plus 10% per annum on demolition costs (from April 30, 1992 to
August 4, 1994 ($2,950.00 x 826 days x 10% per year = $667.58).
$ 89,179.00, as reasonable attorneys' fees up to July 5, 1994, plus
$ 1,518.00, as reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs after July 5, 1994 up to
the date of plaintiffs counsel's affidavit dated July 28, 1994.
$ 5,284.00, (a stipulated sum) as costs. The total of these figures is:
$289,310.37, the TOTAL JUDGMENT, plus post-judgment interest at the legal rate of
5.61% per annum from August 4, 1994 until paid.
DATED this 8 ^davof August, 1994.

Approved as to fo
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this S

day of August, 1994, to the following:

Stephen G. Morgan
Cynthia Meyer
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

da\horrell.jdg
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HORRELL v. FARM BUREAU
Civil No. 920903327CV
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
INTEREST ON RENTAL PAYMENT AT 103
Payment Date

Amount

Interest
Days

Amount

Oct. 28, 1990
Nov. 26, 1990
Dec. 28, 1990
Jan. 30, 1991
March 3, 1991
March 30, 1991
April 30, 1991
June 1, 1991
July 1, 1991
Aug. 3, 1991
Aug. 31, 1991
Sept. 27, 1991
Oct. 30, 1991
Dec. 2, 1991
Dec. 30, 1991
Jan. 29, 1992
Feb. 29, 1992

$350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00
350.00

1374
1346
1314
1281
1249
1224
1191
1160
1129
1096
1068
1041
1008
975
947
917
887

$ 131.75
129.07
126.00
122.84
119.77
117.37
114.21
111.23
108.26
105.10
102.41
99.73
96.65
93.49
90.80
87.93
85.05

TOTAL

$1841.66

ADDENDUM C
(Transcript of Court's Ruling Granting New Trial)

iMfcajS- s- tlMaJsM
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THE COURT:

The Court is persuade»P«*Wt

there is substantial evidence that the claims were
fairly debatable,

I make no finding thereon, but

simply make the observation.
I am convinced and persuaded that the
Court ought not to surrender to overzealous
advocacy.

And it is a more orderly way to proceed in

following the law of the case that that was
established by the Court's order April the 19th,
1994,

in which I had concluded in written form that

the issues on the defenses would be submitted to the
jury on a preponderance of the evidence.

Wherein in

the heat of battle that was or didn't come to my
attention or didn't at least get from counsel to the
Court's mind clearly is beyond me.

But as bad as I

hate to do it, the Court's going to grant a new
trial.

I think that makes the other rulings moot.
MR. MEADE:

Your Honor, we did discuss

that at the time, and -- I mean, there is no —

there

is no case law that supports this one way or the
other in this state.

And I realize that you've

spoken, but the fact of the matter is that a new
trial in this case is going to take a lot of time and
cost a lot of money.

And we could try this case on

this different standard and we could go up and you

001os9>

could be wrong and we will be back.

The worst case

after an appeal is that we try the case twice.

Now,

you are subjecting the parties to the chance that
they may have to try this case three times.

And, I

submit that the -.- that there's no logic involved in
that given the fact that there's no controlling case
law.

You are just taking a shot at it as to what the

burden might be.

And we ought to find out from some

appellate court what the burden is going to be.

And

why spend another $50,000 to get there?
THE COURT:

I agree with the practical

effects.
New trial is granted.
(Hearing adjourned.)
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ADDENDUM D
(Order Granting New Trial)

HUD DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 23J 5
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Fax number: (801) 531-9732

NOV

1994

ik%^
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants

II- THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH

GREGORY S. HORRELL and
BARBARA HORRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INJJLI*
COMPANY, a Utah corporation.,
and FARM BUREAU MUT! 'AL
INSURANCE CO.,

ORDER GRANTING
NEW TRIAL,
VACATING JUDGMENT AND
RELEASING SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Civil No Q-20903327CV
h Kigirup

Jud-.
Defend ,ii lis.

Defendants' Motion for Judgment rv....viiiiMUiU...,. ...

..-.;.

came on for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on Om-N*' p
were represented
iq-.i

•••-

•• V- ,*1- TV Meade of Cohne. Rappaport «\

-v^ai.

1994

Plaintiffs

DwLei.dants were

•' . .au &. Hansen. Having read

and considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, and having heard and considered the
arguments of counsel, and good cause ulheiwise appeaii.!;1,, '

'i •"'., ORDERED !),,,!

Defendants' Motion for New Trial be and the same is hereby granted based on the Court's

0 014 4

requirir

• Pendants .ml tri.il lo prove their affirmative defenses of intentional burning and

misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court; had, in. its April 19. 1994,

be required to prove their affimiative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence and the law
of the case that was established by lIiaL Oidei should

IILIVC

been lollmvcil M tii.il

Hie

^MIII

nil

a new trial on 'the foregoing basis makes the other grounds set forth in Defendants' Motion for
New Trial and the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict moot.
l! is fiiiiiirliiH ORDERED, based

Ill • ("onirfs Onln Grantinp "

Judgment herein dated and entered Au.uus'
It Is fil i i: tl: s i i: OR D

r

• • . he ;tnd r< <mv

- ( eh\ vacated.

i

on or about October 3, ^-„ ., DO and iljie sam^ i„ ; 4 u v i ; ..
DATED this

7_

' day of ©etebftr, 1994.
BY THE COUM :

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

i

%

Keith W. Meade
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

C:\WP5UHORRELLU01227H.OR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the £p-z_ ^ay °f Oct°ber, 1994, in accordance with Rule 4-504(2) of
i

. ition, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

proposed ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL, VACATING JUDGMENT AND RELEASI*
SIJI'HRNHDI'AS BOND In lie uidilul V\A IIISI cl.iss III.III, posLigc piqiaul, In 11 ic. lollmui ,
Keith W. N.™:
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008

C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227H.OR
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ADDENDUM E
(Rule 61, U.R.C.P.)

Rule '

Harmless

errQi

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, ant, .,., v^™
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties,..

ADDENDUM F
(Jury Instructions)

»LED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 2 4 1994
UNTYJ

By

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREGORY S . HORRELL and
BARBARA HORRELL,

Plaintiffs

,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CIVIL NO.

vs .
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant s

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

(See Instructions No. 1 to No. H3

)

920903327

INSTRUCTION NO.

2.5"

If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the claim,
its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute a breach of
its duty.
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if
the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead
a reasonable insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the
claim.

"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which

support the insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that
the denial of the claim would be upheld in court.

In determining

whether or not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and
reasonably justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon
which a reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether
to pay a claim.

This would include the laws or facts supporting

the insured's position that were either known, or that should have
been known, by the insurer.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the

\(

following:
Steven G. Morgan, Esq.
Cynthia C. Meyer, Esq.
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

(lj/horrell.brf)
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day of July, 1995, to the

